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RECENT CASES
AUTOMOBILE GuEST STATUTE-INTENTIONAL IMPACT. Defendant, returnIng with his family from a drive in the country, at the request of his
children that he "give them a thrill", drove into a hump in the highway
at high speed over the protest of his sister in the back seat, who had
been jounced by the hump on the outgoing trip. As a result her back
was broken. Held, that the guest statute applied, and since it was not
shown that defendant intended to injure the plaintiff, the trial court
properly dismissed the case at the close of the plaintiff's evidence.
Parker v. Taylor, 95 Wash. Dec. 611, 81 P. (2d) 806 (1938).
The interpretation of the statute (Wash. Laws 1933, c. 18, § 1, modified
by Wash. Laws 1937, c. 189, § 121) applied in Shea v. Olsen, 185 Wash.
143, 53 P. (2d) 615, 11 A. L. R. 998 (1936); Carufel v. Davis, 188 Wash.
156, 61 P. (2d) 1005 (1936) and Lassiter v. Shell Oil Co., 188 Wash. 371,
62 P. (2d) 1096 (1936), removed injuries to an automobile guest from
the operation of the law of negligence, and placed such injuries within
the field of intentional injury. It has been pointed out that, "the statute
as interpreted by our court means three things: (1) only intentional
injury is actionable, (2) plaintiff must prove this intent specifically, in
the sense, but not to the degree required in cases of suicide, homicide,
or mayhem, and (3) this burden is not sustained merely by showing
recklessness, heedlessness, or gross negligence, since the jury cannot
reasonably infer the necessary intent to injure from these alone." Comment (1937) 12 WASH. L. REV. 138. The principal case adds a further
restriction to the above, i. e., the burden of showing intent is not sustained by showing that the impact causing the injury was intentional.
The restriction indicated above requires qualification of its own, however, since it must be clear that where the intentional impact is of
such a nature as to make it substantially certain that it will produce
injury, the inference that the injury was intentional is irresistible, as
in the case of battery, where the same requirement is met in similar
fashion. "In order that an act may be done with the intention of bringing
about a harmful or offensive contact, the act must be done for the purpose
of causing the contact or with knowledge on the part of the actor that
such contact is substantially certain to be produced." RESTATEiENT,
ToRTs (1934) § 13, comment a. Drawing an analogy from the rule quoted
above, it would seem to follow that a person could come within the scope
of liability under the Washington guest statute merely by the plaintiff's
showing that the impact itself was intentional if the factual situation
were such that there was reasonable certainty that the impact would
result in injury to the guest. In other words, the court could not have
meant that one who playfully drives his car into a ditch would be relieved
from liability, in the absence of proof of the actor's having done the act
for the purpose of injuring those in the car. In such circumstances, the
court would undoubtedly permit recovery under the above rule, due to
the fact that there was a reasonable certainty that injuries would result
from the impact caused, indicating an intent to injure, by inference. In
such cases, where the inference of an intent to kill, maim, or injure is
reasonably to be drawn from showing the intent to create the impact,
it is a question for the jury whether the actor did so intend.
It is submitted that the principal case was correctly decided, in view
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of the fact that it was a case In which no such inference of intent to
injure those in the car could arise, the mere act of "taking a bump" at a
high speed not being one -which might be said to carry with it a reasonable certainty of injury to those in the car. The court, however, when
stating that proof of an intent to create the impact is not enough to
create liability under the statute, might properly have added, "unless
the facts and circumstances are such that the injury was substantially
certain to result from the intended impact". Such qualification in no way
contradicts the rulings in the previous cases, since they merely required
that the injury be intentional, the suggested addition merely being a
test whereby the required intent may be established.
5. H. J.
DANKS AND BANKING-STOCKHOLDERS-SUPERADDED LIABILITY-PERsoNs
LIABLE-BENEFICIAL OwxEas. The directors of three Washington banks
merged into one bank for the ostensible purpose of eliminating duplication of service and to weld three struggling banks into one strong unit.
Simultaneously, and as part of the reorganization plan, a corporation was
formed to hold the shares of stock of the new bank. When the state
supervisor of banks took over the merged bank for liquidation, the holding
company held 900 shares and each of the ten directors had ten shares of
bank stock. The stockholders of the old banks held all of the stock of
the holding company, whose only other assets besides the bank stock,
were the two unused bank buildings. After failure of the holding company to pay its statutory liability, action was brought to collect from
the stockholders of the holding company. Held: The stockholders of the
holding company are liable additionally in proportion to the amount of
stock that they owned. Hansen v. Agnew, 95 Wash. Dec. 294, 180 P. (2d)
845 (1938).
The defense was that the holding company plan was adopted in good
faith and for good reason, and that it is only when the plan is devised
to escape liability that the stockholders should remain liable as owners
of -bank stock. But the court said: "The question of motive is entirely
immaterial; nor is it necessary, in order to permit a recovery In this
case, to disregard the corporate entity of the holding company, or to
invoke the comparatively modern concept of alter ego, or even to faly
back upon considerations of public policy; for the statute contemplates
that the superadded liability shall be that of the real and beneficial
owner of the stock."
Double liability is imposed by statute to provide additional security
to depositors and creditors because it Is the peculiar function of banks
to undertake to care for the money of others. Also, it is imposed to hold
the owners of bank stock to a higher degree of business accountability
because they utilize these funds and derive a profit from them. ZOLLMAN,
BANKS & BANKING, §§ 1611, 1612. The solicitude of the courts in giving
a liberal Interpretation to these statutes arises because of the great ease
by which their purpose could otherwise be evaded by use of the holding
company or other devices. Harris Investment Co. v. Hood, 123 Fla. 598,
167 So. 25 (1936). If an owner of stock transfers it in bad faith to an
irresponsible person, it is void as to bank creditors. Ohio Valley National
Bank v. Hulitt, 204 U. S. 162. A trust arrangement will not be allowed
to defeat statutory liability. Maddison v. Bryan, 31 N. M. 404, 247 Pac. 275
(1926). A holding company organized for the sole purpose of escaping
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liability will not be countenanced. Corker v. Soper, 53 F. (2d) 190 (1931).
The principal case disregarded motive and applied the idea of beneficial ownership, differing perhaps In verbiage from others, but reaching
a result in accord with the unbroken line of authority. Metropolitan
Holding Co. v. Snyder, 79 F. (2d) 263, 103 A. L. R. 912 (1935); Barbour
v. Thomas, 86 F. (2d) 510 (1936) ; Nettles v. Rhett, 94 F. (2d) 42 (1938);
Fors v. Farrel,271 Mich. 358, 260 N. W. 886 (1935).
Who is the beneficial owner? In the instant case the emphasis is upon
a determination of who really furnished the consideration. In all cases the
ultimate consideration flows from the stockholders through the holding
company to the bank. If the holding company has assets, the law will
look no further; if not, the courts find the stockholders liable. In disregarding motive, it seems to be plainly a matter of whether the holding
company has assets enough to meet the liability. See Comment (1938) 36
MICH. L. REV. 1336; Note (1938) 33 ILL. L. REV. 104. The notion of legal
entity as it pertains to a corporation will not be allowed to defeat the
purpose of the statute. Metropolitan Holding Co. v. Snyder, supra; Fors
v. Farrel,supra.
E. K. N.
CRIMINAL LAW-HABITUAL CRIMINAL CHARGE-EVIDENCE-RECORDS OF
CONVICTION IN SISTER STATES. Defendant was convicted of burglary in
the second degree and of being an habitual criminal in that he had suffered three prior convictions for felonies, two of which were in sister
states. The prior convictions in Oregon and California were proved by
certified copies of judgment and sentence from the records of those
courts supplemented by certified photostatic copies of fingerprint records
kept in the respective penitentiaries where the sentences were served.
Conviction affirmed. State v. Harry Johnson, 94 Wash. Dec. 359, 78 P.
(2d) 561 (1938).
Although it is now well settled that identity may be proved by fingerprints, State v. Bolen, 142 Wash. 653, 254 Pac. 445 (1927); W-IGoMORE,
EVIDENCE, § 414 (Supp. 1934), the form and method of making such
proof is of vital significance in protecting the rights of the accused
and in assuring conformity with the rules of evidence. People v. Reese,
258 N. Y. 89, 179 N. E. 305, 79 A. L. R. 1329 (1932).
State statutes
generally provide for admission and effect of certified copies of nonjudicial records kept under authority of the state or federal laws, REM.
REV. STAT. § 1257, § 1260; State v. Bolen, supra, and of certified copies
of judicial records of sister states, REM. REV. STAT. § 1254; but as to
admission and effect of certified copies of non-judicial records kept in
sister states, state statutes are generally silent. Reed v. Stevens, 120
Me. 290, 113 Atl. 712 (1921); 3 WIGoaORE, EVIDENCE, (2d Ed.) § 1652 n. 4.
Missouri, California and West Virginia, however, have such statutes;
but they are strictly construed and made to conform to such rules of
evidence as require preliminary proof that they are public records,
that they are kept In accordance with the law of the state, and that
the certifying officer is the legal custodian. State v. Hendrix, 331 Mo.
658, 56 S. W. (2d) 76 (1932); People v. Darling, 120 Cal. App. 453, 7 P.
(2d) 1094 (1932); Central Trust Co. of Illinois v. Hearne, 78 W. Va. 6,
88 S. E. 450 (1916). Congress has provided a certain procedural method
for certifying copies of non-judicial records of a sister state, REV. STAT.
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§ 906 (1875), 28 U. S. C. 688 (1934); and that when so certified, such
records shall have the same effect in sister states as they have in their
home state. At first glance such a provision seems to be an interference
with state judicial procedure, 'but the fact that it is simply a nonexclusive, alternative means of proof, (3 WIGMoPE, EVIDENCE (2d' ed.
1923) § 1680a; Reed, v. Stevens, supra) minimizes any supposed interference; also it should be noticed that this federal statute was enacted
by Congress In pursuance of the power delegated by the full faith and
credit clause of the United States Constitution. U. S. Constitution, Art.
IV, Sec. 1. The state in the instant case had carefully followed this method
of authentication laid out in the federal statute; and the court, relying
on dicta in two prior Washington cases, James v. James, 35 Wash. 650,
77 Pac. 1080 (1904); State v. Kniffen, 44 Wash. 485, 87 Pac. 837, 190 Am.
St. Rep. 1009 (1906), approved the procedure.
Since 1804, when this statute was passed, many states have accepted
the procedure as sufficient authentication for copies of non-judicial
records from sister states, Strode v. Churchill, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 75 (1822);
Reid v. State, 168 Ala. 118, 53 So. 254 (1910); Garigues v. Harris, 17
Pa. 344 (1851); Chase v. Caryl, 57 N. J. L. 545, 31 Atl. 1024 (1895);
but for proving prior convictions in sister states by copies of prison
records, this method has not been used and approved in any court of
this country prior to the instant decision. In People v. Reese, supra,
Cardozo, J., though holding inadmissible certified copies of fingerprint
records from Oregon and Washington offered under the provisions of
a New York statute, indicated that such records would be admissible
if properly certified and correctly used by the prosecution. It seems
that a photostatic copy of a fingerprint record authenticated in accordance -with the federal statute should be sufficient; and, in fact, such
authentication, though not exclusive, might be considered binding on
the state courts in view of the provisions of Articles IV and VI of the
Federal Constitution. 3 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 1652.
D. G. S.
INJUnY To BuSINESS--FALING WALLS - DAMAGES - AILOWANCE FoR
ADVEnTISING.
Defendants owned a three-story -brick structure upon a

business corner. The interior was destroyed by fire, whereupon the
owners had the premises inspected by the city engineer, the city building inspector, the Board of Public Works, a brick contractor, a brick
manufacturer and two brick masons, all of whom agreed that the walls
were safe. Owners then allowed the walls to stand as they were for
a period of 40 days, when they fell during a high -wind, damaging the
business house next door and injuring an employee therein. Held: That
the owners were guilty of negligence and hence liable for the damages
and injuries. Among the items of damages allowed by the court was
the sum of $375 to cover advertising which would be required to rehabilitate the business to its normal state. Boyd M. Teeter et aZ V.
Olimpia Lodge No. 1, I. 0. 0. F., 95 Wash. Dec. 149, 80 P. (2d) 547 (1938).
The allowance for advertising raises the question as to how stringently the court will enforce the rule against the allowance of speculative damages. While the question of damages depends upon many
matters, the Washington court has adherred to the principle that damages awarded must -be reasonably certain and free from the taint of
speculation and conjecture. DeHoney v. Gjarde, 134 Wash. 647, 236
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Pac. 290 (1925); Pearce v. Puget Sound Broadcasting Co., 170 Wash.
472, 16 P. (2d) 843 (1932); North Star, etc., v. Alaska Yukon, etc., 68
While this rule would appear to be
Wash. 457, 123 Pac. 605 (1912).
quite rigid, actually it is flexible. Once the fact of damage is established with certainty, the difficulty of determining the amount of damage is no bar to recovery. Park v. Northport Smelting & Refining Co.,
The court does hold, however, that
47 Wash. 597, 92 Pac. 442 (1907).
the amount of damage must be shown with "reasonable accuracy" if
recovery is to be had. Schultz v. Wells Butchers' Supply Co., 151 Wash.
382, 275 Pac. 737 (1929); Schermerhorn' v. Sayles, 123 Wash. 139, 212
But it clearly appears that "reasonable accuracy" Is
Pac. 156 (1923).
a rather loose requirement that the evidence define some limits within
which the amount may be reasonably determined. The instant case
would seem to go rather far as no limits are indicated other than what
the parties in interest were willing to spend.
Admittedly some advertising would be required to restore the business to its status quo. But such restoration depends not only on advertising, but upon any number of intangible and elusive factors inherent
in any business, such as good will, physical location (actually changed
in this case), the season of the year, activities of competitors, efficiency
of employees, and many others. To single out this one factor without
some definite experience to go by, would seem, of necessity, to give
a result tainted with the stigma of speculation and conjecture to a
most unusual degree.
G. M. M.
K]DNAPING-RwARD-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE. Defendant, a fugitive from justice, pressed a knife against the neck of a taxicab driver
and forced him to drive toward another city. Defendant was subsequently apprehended and indicted under the new Washington kidnaping
statute which provides, "Every person who shall wilfully seize, confine
or inveigle another with intent to cause him without authority of law
to be secretly confined or imprisoned, or in any way held to service
with the intent to extort money or reward for his release or disposition.
shall be guilty of kidnaping in the first degree . . ." Wash. Laws Spec.
Sess. 1933, c. 6, § 1, RarF. REV. STAT. (Supp.) § 2410. Held: Kidnaping
may be committed either by confining another with Intent to secretly
imprison, or by confining another with intent to hold him to service.
There is no necessity in the present case to determine whether the phrase
"to extort money or reward" should be appended to both methods of committing the offense or only to the latter, for the defendant secretly confined the driver within the meaning of the statute and the assistance
rendered the defendant in his flight from justice was a benefit amounting
to reward under the statute. State v. Andre, 95 Wash. Dec. 182, 80 P.
(2d) 553 (1938).
The instant case raises two problems regarding the effect and operation of the kidnaping statute in Washington; the interpretation of the
phrase "money or reward"; and the construction of the statute as an
entirety to determine whether the intent to hold for money or reward
is essential to both methods of perpetrating the offense, or only the
latter, viz., holding to service.
The United States Supreme Court, intepreting the Federal Kidnaping
Act, 18 U. S. C. A. Sec. 408a, containing the phrase "held for ransom
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or reward or otherwise," in Gooch v. U. S., 297 U. S. 124 (1936), where
an officer was confined in order to prevent the arrest of the fugitive,
stated, "holding an officer to prevent the captor's arrest is something
done with the expectation of benefit to the transgressor . . . If the word
'reward', as commonly understood, is not itself broad enough to include
benefits expected to follow the prevention of an arrest, they fall within
the broad term, 'otherwise.'" The Washington court in deeming a benefit
to the transgressor within the contemplation of the reward clause, although without the assistance of an all-inclusive word as "otherwise,"
relied on Gooch v. U. S., supra, and took the view that "The statute
should be given a reasonable construction in order to aid in the efficient
enforcement of the law and promote the ends of justice." The application and scope of the kidnaping statute in Washington is undoubtedly
extended by the instant case, but what "things" will be considered benefits to the transgressor, and hence rewards, are impossible of prior
delineation.
A consideration of the second question involves a glance at the development of kidnaping law and the motivating factors of the present statute
in Washington. At common law, kidnaping was false imprisonment with
the added element of carrying the person detained out of his country
and beyond the protection of his laws. State v. Hoyle, 114 Wash. 290,
194 Pac. 976 (1921); State v. Olson, 76 Utah 181, 289 Pac. 92 (1930);
8 R. C. L. 296. Early statutory enactment, nurtured by the necessity
of providing -for those cases in which the person detained was confined
within the state, established that transportation of the person seized
to another state was not an essential part of the offense of kidnaping.
State v. Harrison, 145 N. C. 408, 59 S. E. 867 (1907); State U. Rollins,
8 N. H. 550 (1837). In Washington, as in most jurisdictions, secret confinement of the victim within the state was sufficient to constitute kidnaping. See: State v. Harion, 175 Wash. 94, 26 P. (2d) 614 (1933);
Hackbrath v. State, 210 Wis. 3, 229 N. W. 83 (1930); People -V.Hope,257
N. Y. 147, 177 N. E. 402 (1931); 8 R. C. L. 296.
Such was the tenor of law in Washington before the enactment of
the present statute, which was one of many laws enacted throughout
the country following the Lindbergh and other kidnaping cases. Since
1932, thirty-one states have revised their kidnaping laws and all but
fourteen have provided death penalties. 26 JouRNAL OF CRitINAL LAW
AND CmiNoLoGy 762.
In construing the statute it must be kept in mind that, before its
enactment, confinement within the state was sufficient to constitute the
offense; that the statute was designed to broaden the application of the
existing laws, and that, if the ransom clause were appended to both
methods of committing the crime, confinement within the state would
not constitute kidnaping unless the intent to obtain money or reward
were present. It is difficult to believe that such an interpretation would
be reasonable under the circumstances, for the operation of the law would
be restricted to those cases in which the transgressor had the intent
to obtain money or reward. It is submitted, therefore, that the reward
clause applies to the second method of committing the offense, Viz., holding to service, and that secret confinement within the state is sufficient
to constitute the first method of committing the offense.
M. D. L.
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PROBATE-STATUTES OF NON-CLAIM. Plaintiff was the sole heir at law
of his wife and the sole devisee under her non-intervention will which
named him executor. Ahbout two years after her death, before filing the
will for probate, plaintiff in his individual capacity, presented claims of
his deceased wife against an estate represented by the defendants within
the six months statute of non-claim, REm. REV. STAT., § 1477-84. The defendants rejected such claims. Plaintiff then probated the will of his
wife and became duly appointed executor under it and sought to recover
as executor under his wife's will on the claims which he had presented
as an individual. Held: The plaintiff could recover, since he was the
sole heir at law of the testatrix, sole devisee and executor under her will,
and since the will was a non-intervention one. Boettner v. Czerny, 95
Wash. Dec. 216, 80 P. (2d) 778 (1938).
The court based its decision on Harvey v. Pocock, 100 Wash. 263, 170
Pac. 545 (1918), which involved precisely the same facts, except that
the will had been filed but not yet probated. The court pointed out in
the Boettner case, supra, that this difference was not vital.
Many states have non-claim statutes similar to REA. REV. STAT. §
1477-84, which in substance provides that all creditors' claims which
are not duly presented against decedents' estates within six months of
notice to creditors shall be forever barred.
Such statutes are really
special statutes of limitation, designed to facilitate and expedite the
settlement of decedents' estates. BANCROFT'S PROBATE PRACTICE, § 754, 757.
The general rule is that such claims must be presented by the owner
or his authorized agent. Rayburn v. Rayburn, 130 Ala. 217, 30 So.
365 (1901); Cook v. Davis, 12 Ala. 551 (1847).
Although some courts
have been lenient in fact situations like the Boettner case, supra, yet
the claimant in such a case is a legal stranger to the claim and has
neither legal title, McKenney v. Minahan, 119 Wis. 651, 97 N. V. 489
(1903); nor by the majority rule, equitable title to the claim presented.
Annotation (1906) 112 Am. St. Rep. 727.
In an early Vermont case the court held that an award in favor of
an estate of which plaintiff was administratrix, which was presented
against the defendant estate as a claim in favor of the heirs, could later
be sued upon by the plaintiff as administratrix. Holdridge v. Holdridge,
53 Vt. 546 (1881). In Hunt v. Curtis, 151 Ala. 507, 44 So. 54 (1907),
the court held that a claim presented by heirs at law of a deceased
creditor satisfied the statute of non-claim, on the theory that they had
an equitable interest in such a claim, a theory followed by but few states.
Annotation 112 Am. St. Rep. 730. The same court holds that a claim
presented by an administrator whose appointment was absolutely void
and who was not an heir or legatee, does not satisfy the statute. McDowell v. Jones, 58 Ala. 25 (1877). California has definitely held that
an executor duly qualified in a foreign state who does not take out
ancillary letters of administration in the state of the debtor estate can
not make an effective presentation of claim satisfying the statute of
non-claim. Winbigler v. Shattuck, 50 Cal. App. 562, 195 Pac. 707 (1920).
Contra: Feustmann v. Gott, 65 Mich. 592, 32 N. W. 869 (1887).
It is submitted that on principle, claims presented by a legal stranger,
as in the Boettner case, supra, cannot be upheld, since to permit such
claims will result in frustration of the purpose of the non-claim statute,
viz., the expeditious settling of decedents' estates. Because no prudent
executor or administrator of a debtor estate would allow and pay such
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claim to a legal stranger, it will be rejected. And such rejection can
only lead to litigation and confusion, prolonging the settlement of the
estate, an evil which presentation by the proper party would in most cases
avoid.
W. B. D.
PunLIc SALES-SUBSTANTIAL COmPLIANCE WrrIH STATUTE.
Because of
inclement weather, deputy county auditor conducted a public timber
sale inside the door, but within view of persons outside, instead of "in
front of" the courthouse as required by the sale statute (REM. REV. STAT.
§ 7797-49); the state land commissioner refused to confirm the sale, otherwise regular, and ordered purchase price returned. The Superior Court
upheld commissioner's order. Purchaser appealed. Held: The sale as
made was conducted substantially as required by law and should have
been confirmed. Polson Logging Co. v. A. 0. Martin, Cominissioner of
Public Lands, 95 Wash. Dec. 144, 80 P. (2d) 767 (1938).
In the instant case the court relies upon "substantial compliance" as
being sufficient. The opinion refers to decisions of other courts holding
that substantial compliance with statutory requirements for sale "at
the courthouse door" was sufficient. See also Mohawk Bridge Co. v.
Utica & S. R. Co., 6 Paige (N. Y.) 562 (1837); Harris v. State ex rel.
Dolan, 72 Miss. 960, 18 So. 387, 33 L. R. A. 85 (1895).
Other Washington statutes require the sale to be held "at the courthouse door" (REM. REV. STAT. § 583, execution sales; REM. REv. STAT.
§ 11281, notice of tax judgment sale; REm. REv. STAT. § 11294, sale of
county property), whereas seemingly only in the statute construed in
the instant case appear the words "in front of" the courthouse.
These -words have been defined to mean "'immediately in front' or
'in front and near to.'" Merrill v. Nelson, 18 Minn. 366, 376; 18 Gil. 335,
339 (1872).
"Before" is synonymous with "in front of." (WEBSTER, NEw INTERN(ATIONAL DIcTioNARY).
In Rubey v. Huntsmn, 32 Mo. 501, 82 Am. Dec.
143 (1862), a sale made inside the courthouse was declared void for failure
to comply with the statute requiring the sale to be before the courthouse
door. The court said, "It is immaterial whether it was more convenient
to all persons or better in any respect to sell within than before the
courthouse; the law has prescribed the place of sale and that is the only
proper place; and it is so because the law has said so, and there can be
no reasoning about it." The following year -the above decision was expressly re-affirmed -when a sale was held inside the courthouse door.
McNair v. Jenson, 33 Mo. 312 (1863). In Harpald v. Arant, 64 Ore. 376,
130 Pac. 737 (1913), the court considering a statute requiring sale at the
courthouse door noted the distinction between the word "before" as
employed in the Missouri statute and the word "at" employed in the
Oregon statute. Cf. Smith v. Cox, 115 Ala. 503, 22 So. 78 (1897).
REu REv. STAT. § 591 provides that execution sales shall be confirmed
unless ". . . it shall satisfactorily appear that there were substantial
Irregularities in the proceedings concerning the sale to the probable loss
or injury of the party objecting... " Provision for substantial compliance
Is not specifically made in the other Washington statutes cited above.
As the court in the instant case indicated, however, there is implied
in the provisions for confirmation that substantial compliance will satisfy.
The commissioner is directed to confirm if it appears the sale was fairly
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conducted and other requirements designed to protect the state's interest
are met (REM. REV. STAT. § 7797-53).
The principle of substantial compliance adopted by the Washington
court seems preferable to the strict construction followed by the Missouri court.
H. M. C.
TAXATION-INHERITANCE

TAx-DOCTRINE

OF

RETAINER-DISTRIBUTIVE

SHARES. At the death of the decedent, one of his sons was indebted to
him on a note barred by the statute of limitations, in a sum greater
than his distributive share of the estate. The son was insolvent at that
time. The plaintiff, Supervisor of the State Inheritance Tax Division,
sought to fix the tax upon the basis of an evaluation of the estate which
included this note at its face value. Held: That, while the amount inherited by the insolvent son was properly retained and distributed to
the other heirs in the same class, it should not be Included as an asset
of the estate In fixing its value for inheritance tax purposes. In re
Bower's Estate, 96 Wash. Dec. 33, 81 P. (2d) 813 (1938).
It is apparently well settled in this state that an executor or administrator may retain against a devisee or heir the amount of any indebtedness due the estate. Boyer v. Robinson, 26 Wash. 117, 66 Pac. 119 (1901);
In re Braden's Estate, 122 Wash. 669, 211 Pac. 743 (1923); In re Doepkes
Estates, 182 Wash. 556, 47 P. (2d) 1009 (1935). This rule seems to
apply even where the indebtedness has been barred by the statute of
limitations. In re Smith's Estate, 179 Wash. 417, 38 P. (2d) 244 (1934);
In re Hamilton's Estate, 190 Wash. 646, 70 P. (2d) 426 (1937). And so
hold the majority of American jurisdictions. See: Thompson v. McCune,
333 Mo. 758, 63 S. W. (2d) 41 (1933); 3 WOERNER, AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION (3rd ed. 1923) § 564; annotations In 1 A. L. R. 991, 1007;
110 A. L. R. 1384, 1385. The Washington court has not had occasion to
pass upon the effect of the debtor's bankruptcy upon the doctrine of
retainer, but by analogy and on the authority of the prevailing rule in
other jurisdictions, it seems likely that the right of set-off will be similarly allowed in this situation. See the cases collected in 1 A. L. R.
991, 1010, 1042; 30 A. L. R. 775, 781; 75 A. L. R. 878, 889; and 110 A. L. R.
1384, 1389. And the same will probably be true where the devisee or
heir indebted to the testator is insolvent. Chdse National Bank of City
of New York v. Sayles, 30 F. (2d) 178 (1927); Woods v. Knotts, 196
Iowa 544, 194 N. W. 953, 30 A. L. R. 768 (1923); Lambright v. Lamnbright,
74 Ohio St. 198, 78 N. E. 265, 6 Ann. Cas. 807 (1906); Gosnell v. Flack,
76 Md. 423, 25 AtI. 411, 18 L. R. A. 158 (1892); 9 R. C. L. 110. However,
in a number of jurisdictions this rule, in all its variations, is held to
be inapplicable where real property passes by descent, no set-off being
allowed. Marvin v. Bowlby, 142 Mich. 245, 105 N. W. 751, 113 A. S. R.
574, 7 Ann. Cas. 559, 4 L. R. A. (N. s.) 189 (1905); Procter v. Newhall. 17
Mass. 81 (1820). Contra: Boyer v. Robinson, supra; Ruiz v. Campbell,
6 Tex. Civ. App. 714, 26 S. W. 295 (1894).
The decision is probably sound as far as the tax question is concerned,
because no property of any actual market value passes by the discharge
of the barred debt in the process of set-off, and so there is no transfer
of property to subject to taxation, within the meaning of the statute.
REM. REV. STAT. (Supp.) § 11201. In re Manning's Estate, 169 N. Y. 449,
62 N. E. 565 (1902); PINKERTON AND MILLSAPS, INHERITANCE AND ESTATE
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TAXES (1926) § 311. But see Fry's Estate, 74 Pa. D. & C. 577 (1930).
But the implications of the case as to the proper distribution of an
estate involving a set-off are somewhat subject to question. For if, as
is suggested, the barred debt is to be set off against the debtor's share
of the estate, excluding the barred debt, rather than against his share
of the estate including the face value of the debt, the result will be
to unduly penalize the debtor who is perhaps already insolvent. A fairer
and more logical way to handle both the question of distribution and the
question of taxation would seem to be to regard this outlawed debt in
analogy to an advance on the debtor's share of the decedent's estate.
This would mean that the debt would be Included in the estate in determining the debtor's distributive share, and then would be set off
against that share, as is actually done in the case of an advance. REM.
REV. STAT. § 1348, P. C. § 9853; Springer's Appeal, 29 Pa. St. (1857); 3
WOERNER, AMERICAN LA.v OF ADMINISTRATIoN § 552; 4 ScHouLE, WILLs,
EXECUTORs AND ADMINISTATORS (6th ed. 1923) § 3114. Then, if the debtor
receives anything In addition to the discharge of his obligation, that and
that alone would be subjected to taxation. Such a course would not
necessarily be inconsistent with the instant case.
K. A. C.
WORKMEN'S CoMPENsATIoN-OcCuPAToNAI
DIsEASES.
The Washington
Legislature in 1937 passed an amendment to the Workmen's Compensation
Act, providing that "Compensation shall be payable for disabilities sustained or death incurred by an employee resulting from the following
occupational diseases:", listing various diseases under twenty-one heads.
(Wash. Laws 1937, c. 212, p. 1031). In an action to enjoin enforcement
of Chapter 212 against a logging company, the company proved that in
its Industry there -ere no "occupational diseases" as defined in this
statute. Held: The plaintiff was not within the statute. Polson Logging
Company v. Kelly as Director of the Department of Labor and Industries,
95 Wash. Dec. 132, 80 P. (2d) 412 (1938).
Under the Laws of 1911, c. 74, § 3, "injury" was defined as meaning "An injury resulting from some fortuitous event as distinguished
from the contraction of disease". In Depre v. Pacific Coast Forge
Co., 145 Wash. 263, 259 Pac. 720 (1927), as the result of improper ventilation, escaping gases and vapors from a tank of muriatic and sulphuric
acid greatly lessened the plaintiff's resistance and he contracted tuberculosis. It was held that this was not an injury within the definition.
In Seattle Can Company v. Department of Labor and Industries, 147
Wash. 303, 265 Pac. 739 (1928), an employee was poisoned by the benzol
acid fumes given off in the room wherein she worked. Here also there
was improper ventilation and the poisoning had serious physical effects
on the plaintiff. It was held that there was an injury within the definition, and the employee was entitled to compensation. The Depre case
was distinguished in part on the ground that there a "germ disease" was
Involved. The statute was said to be aimed only at excluding such diseases as are classed as "germ diseases". At this point in the development
of the judicial construction of the word "injury", as long as the event
was proved to be fortuitous and no germ disease was involved, the workman could recover under the act.
In 1927 the legislature re-defined "injury" to mean "a sudden and
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tangible happening of a traumatic nature, producing an immediate or
prompt result, and occurring from without, and such physical condition
as results therefrom". (Wash. Larws, 1927, c. 310, § 2.) In Pellerin v.
Washington Veneer Co., 163 Wash. 555, 2 P. (2d) 658 (1931), there was
carbon bisulphide poisoning, and no "germ disease" was involved. There
was an element of negligence for not having better ventilation. It was
held that under the 1927 amendment there could no longer be recovery
for poisoning which was the result of the occupation, even if fortuitous,
unless the injury were a sudden one and of a traumatic nature. This
was followed in Calhoun v. Washington Veneer Co., 170 Wash. 152, 15 P.
(2d) 943 (1932); and in Hatcher v. Globe Union Mfg. Co., 170 Wash.
494, 16 P. (2d) 824 (1932). Thus, until 1937, the employee was left
with his common-law action against the employer for failure to provide a
reasonably safe place to work.
By the specific mention in Chapter 212, Laws of 1937 of the diseases
to be compensable, the legislature impliedly excluded all other occupational diseases. The legislature was free to adopt a more general definition and to include "all occupational diseases growing out of and incidental to the employment." Such a statute is in force in Wisconsin.
(Wis. STATS. 1921 § 2394-32). The obvious advantage of such a general
statute is that there is no discrimination among industries as to which
are and which are not covered. Neither is there any discrimination
among occupational diseases which might arise in the same industry.
Yet in Washington the act has the distinct advantage of naming definitely
the occupational diseases to come under it. It does not leave that naming
to a process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.
J. M. D.

